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Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities
Abstract
We provide estimates of the effects and long-run elasticities of the tax base with respect to tax rates for
four large U.S. cities: Houston (property taxation), Minneapolis (property taxation), New York City
(property, general sales, and income taxation), and Philadelphia (property, gross receipts, and wage
taxation). Results suggest that three of our cities are near the peaks of their revenue hills; Minneapolis is
the exception. A significant negative effect of a balanced-budget increase in city property tax rates on the
city property base is interpreted as a capitalization effect and suggests that marginal increases in city
spending do not provide positive net benefits to property owners. Estimates of the effects of taxes on city
employment levels for New York City and Philadelphia'the two cities for which employment series are
available—show the local income and wage tax rates have significant negative effects on city
employment levels. Cuts in these tax rates are likely to be an economically cost-effective way to increase
city jobs. High taxes, sometimes by diminishing consumption of the taxed commodities, and sometimes
by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn
from more moderate taxes. (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, book V, chapter II.) It is a signal
advantage of taxes on articles of consumption that they contain in their own nature a security against
excess. If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to
the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. (Alexander
Hamilton, “Further Defects of the Present Constitution,” Federalist Papers, No. 21.) If a tax is gradually
increased from zero up to the point where it becomes prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increase by
small stages until it reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero again.
[Jules Dupuit, “On the Measurement of Utility from Public Works,” reprinted in K. Arrow and Tibor
Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics (Homewood, IL: Richard D.Irwin, 1969).] Nor should the
bbargument seem strange that taxation may be so high as to defeat its object, and that, given sufficient
time to gather the fruits, a reduction bbbbbof taxation will run a better chance than increase of balancing
the budget. (John Maynard Keynes, Collected Works of John Maynard Keynes, St. Martin's Press, p. 338.)
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LOCAL REVENUE HILLS: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR U.S. CITIES
Andrew Haughwout, Robert Inman, Steven Craig, and Thomas Luce*
Abstract—We provide estimates of the effects and long-run elasticities of
the tax base with respect to tax rates for four large U.S. cities: Houston
(property taxation), Minneapolis (property taxation), New York City
(property, general sales, and income taxation), and Philadelphia (property,
gross receipts, and wage taxation). Results suggest that three of our cities
are near the peaks of their revenue hills; Minneapolis is the exception. A
significant negative effect of a balanced-budget increase in city property
tax rates on the city property base is interpreted as a capitalization effect
and suggests that marginal increases in city spending do not provide
positive net benefits to property owners. Estimates of the effects of taxes
on city employment levels for New York City and Philadelphia—the two
cities for which employment series are available—show the local income
and wage tax rates have significant negative effects on city employment
levels. Cuts in these tax rates are likely to be an economically costeffective way to increase city jobs.
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing consumption of the taxed
commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently
afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn
from more moderate taxes. (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations,
book V, chapter II.)
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption that
they contain in their own nature a security against excess . . . If
duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is
eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when
they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. (Alexander
Hamilton, “Further Defects of the Present Constitution,” Federalist Papers, No. 21.)
If a tax is gradually increased from zero up to the point where it
becomes prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increase by small
stages until it reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines
until it becomes zero again. [Jules Dupuit, “On the Measurement of
Utility from Public Works,” reprinted in K. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics (Homewood, IL: Richard D.
Irwin, 1969).]
Nor should the argument seem strange that taxation may be so high
as to defeat its object, and that, given sufficient time to gather the
fruits, a reduction of taxation will run a better chance than increase
of balancing the budget. (John Maynard Keynes, Collected Works of
John Maynard Keynes, St. Martin’s Press, p. 338.)

I.

Introduction

F

ROM Smith to Dupuit to Keynes, understanding the
equilibrium effects of taxation on the level and location
of economic activities has long been of scholarly interest to
public finance economists. From our first Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander Hamilton to today’s mayors, governors,
and presidents, the issue has been of no less importance to
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elected officials. Today, almost no city, state, or national
budget fails to mention the wisdom of controlling taxes to
enhance economic development and job growth. During
periods of fiscal crises, as in FY 2003, predicting the effects
of a local tax increases on equilibrium revenues becomes
essential if mayors or governors are to design credible
strategies for balancing city and state budgets, both for
today and for the longer run. While there is general agreement that local taxes matter, we are still far from a consensus as to how much.1
This paper provides econometric estimates of the effects of
local taxation on local economic activities in four large U.S.
cities: Houston, Minneapolis, New York City, and Philadelphia. Given those estimates, we then compute each city’s
revenue hill, known perhaps more familiarly as the city’s
“Laffer curve.” Our evidence places Houston, New York City,
and Philadelphia near the peaks of their respective revenue
hills, whereas Minneapolis remains comfortably down its revenue hill with significant additional taxing capacity. In all four
of our sample cities, however, we find the marginal tax dollar
fails to deliver a full dollar of capitalized public service
benefits, suggesting that distributive local politics may be
setting our cities’ budgets, at least on the margin. For our two
cities for which we have annual employment data, New York
and Philadelphia, we find that tax increases reduce city jobs
and that lowering city taxes is likely to be a cost-effective way
to increase city employment.
II.

The Effects of Taxation in an Open City Economy

Large cities offer only one of many competitive locations
for residents and firms. Capital, labor, and households are
mobile, both across locations in a given economic region
and between regions. Capital located in a city must earn the
competitive rate of return, goods produced within the city
must sell at competitive prices, commuting labor working in
the city must earn a competitive wage, and residents living
and working within the city must receive an overall level of
utility comparable to that available outside the city.
Haughwout and Inman (2001, 2002) have presented a
general equilibrium model of city fiscal competition with
just these features. Their analysis is an extension of the
1 Bartik (1991) still provides the best overall summary of what we know
about the effects of local taxation on local economic activity generally.
Additional studies since Bartik’s survey confirm his conclusion that taxes
have significant negative effects on the location of economic activity in
open economies. On the effects of city taxation on city economic activity,
see Inman (1995) for Philadelphia and Mark, McGuire, and Papke (2000)
for Washington, DC. On the adverse economic effects of state taxation,
see Hines (1996) and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) for U.S. states, and
Feld and Kirchgassner (2003) for Swiss cantons. And finally, at the
country level, see Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) for strong evidence that
taxation influences the level of foreign direct investment across economic
regions.
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pioneering model of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) of
firm and labor locations in a spatial economy.The HaughwoutInman model defines an equilibrium wage and an equilibrium land value for the city as well as equilibrium quantities
of city residential housing and consumption, firm use of
capital, land, and labor, and finally, total city output. Each
endogenous city price and quantity is a function of a vector
of all city tax rates () and the level of city services (G), the
market interest rate (r), alternative wages (q) for workers
who commute, the world price for city exports (⬅1), the
level of profit available to firms in their next best alternative
(⌸0 ⬅ 0), and the level of utility available to city residents
in their next best location (V 0 ). The vector of city tax rates
() includes a tax on residential and commercial property
( p ), a tax on resident consumption ( s ), taxes on resident
( w ) and commuter ( m ) labor incomes, and a tax on gross
receipts from city production ( x ). 2
The Haughwout-Inman model differs from the more
familiar Tiebout-Oates capitalization specification (dating from 1969) of local public economies by explicitly
including firms as well as households as market participants setting equilibrium prices and quantities. Endogenous city prices and quantities define in turn city tax
bases per resident. The city’s property tax base (B p ) is
defined as the sum of the endogenous market value of
residential housing and residential land plus endogenous
firm capital and commercial land divided by endogenous
city population. The city sales tax base (B s ) equals
endogenous consumption per resident within the city. The
city’s resident earned income tax base (B w ) equals the
endogenous resident wage. The city’s nonresident earned
income tax base (B m ) equals the exogenous commuter
wage times the endogenous number of city commuterworkers divided by the endogenous city population. Finally, the city’s gross receipts tax base (B x ) equals the
endogenous city output per resident. Each tax base depends on all city tax rates [ ⫽ ( p ,  s ,  w ,  m ,  x )] and
city public services (G), exogenous market prices (q, 1,
r), and the attractiveness of alternative locations available to city firms (⌸0 ⬅ 0) and households (V 0 ). Generally,
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the city to provide public services. Revenue hills are an
equilibrium representation and allow for the balancedbudget effect of rates on base; see Inman (1989). Changes in
city tax rates change the level of public goods provided
within the city through the city’s budget constraint, specified as
G⬅

冘  B 共, G; 䡠 兲 ⫹ Z ,
t

t

t

c

where ¥ t  t B t (, G; 䡠 ) is city total tax revenues,  is the
vector of all city tax rates, Z is nontax city revenues
(exogenous fees and grants), and c is an exogenous price
index for local public service. Solving the budget identity
for G and substituting into equation (1) provides the general
equilibrium, balanced-budget relationship between city tax
rates and a city tax base:3
B t ⫽ b t 共; Z, c, r, q, 1, V0 兲.

(2)

Tax revenues raised from any city tax rate will therefore
equal
T t ⫽  t 䡠 b t 共; Z, c, r, q, 1, V0 兲

(3)

for each local tax (t ⫽ p, s, w, m, x). The city’s
equilibrium revenue hill is now defined as the aggregate of
all city revenues for each combination of city tax rates,
specified as
REV ⫽

冘  䡠 b 共; Z, c; r, q, 1, V 兲 ⫹ Z.
t

t

0

(4)

t

A small increase (⌬ j ) in any individual tax rate results in
an equilibrium balanced-budget change in total city revenues of
⌬REV ⫽ ⌬ j 䡠 B j ⫹

冘  䡠 冋 B ε ⌬ 册 .
t tj

j

t

t

(5)

j

where t ⫽ p, s, w, m, or x for each of the five possible city
tax bases.
A correct specification of a city’s revenue hill first relates
city tax rates to city tax bases and then to city revenues, but
only after removing the effect of tax rates on the ability of

The first term of equation (5) measures the direct revenue
effect of a small change in one of the city’s tax rates ( j ),
holding fixed that tax’s own tax base. The second term
measures the indirect equilibrium revenue effects of the rate
change after all local tax bases, including the tax’s own
base, have fully responded to the change in the local rate
and to the balanced-budget adjustments in G. The expression within brackets measures the change in each tax base
because of the small change in  j , where ε tj is the equilibrium elasticity of the base B t with respect to changes in rate

2 The model and our empirical analysis do not include a tax on firm
excess profits. Since capital is freely mobile across cities, capital must
earn the competitive rate of return. There are, therefore, no excess profits
to be taxed. The analysis does allow the city to differentially tax capital in
place, however. This can be accomplished by differentially taxing land
and capital through the city’s property tax; see Haughwout and Inman
(2002).

3 To ensure an equilibrium level of tax base and therefore tax revenues,
we must assume the conditions for the implicit function theorem hold for
the system of tax base equations plus the budget identity. Sufficient for a
stable equilibrium is that c ⬎ ¥ t  t B t /G, or in words, increasing the
public good G by one unit does not bring in more in tax revenues (¥ t  t
B t /G) than it costs to produce the good (c); see Haughwout and Inman
(2001).

B t ⫽ B t 共, G; q, 1, r, V0 兲,

(1)
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 j . In the special case where all cross-base effects of a
change in  j are zero (ε tj ⫽ 0, j ⫽ t), we obtain the familiar
specification that
⌬REV ⫽ ⌬ j 䡠 B j ⫹  j 䡠

冋

册

B j ε jj ⌬ j
⫽ B j 共1 ⫹ ε jj 兲⌬ j .
j
(5⬘)

In this case, when a tax base’s own rate-to-base elasticity is
ε jj ⬎ ⫺1 (for example, ⫺0.5), then tax revenues increase
with small increases in a tax’s own tax rate and the city will
be on a rising portion of its revenue hill (⌬R/⌬ j ⬎ 0).
When ε jj ⫽ ⫺1, the city is at the top of its revenue hill
(⌬R/⌬ j ⫽ 0), and when ⫺1 ⬎ ε jj (for example, ⫺1.5),
the city is on the falling side of the revenue hill (⌬R/⌬ j ⬍
0). Since tax revenues are allocated to the purchase of
public goods when specifying the tax base and revenue hill
equations, it is possible for a city’s ε tj ’s to be positive—for
example, when land taxes are used to finance valued public
goods as in Brueckner (1982). The actual values of a city’s
ε tj ’s is an empirical issue. Section III provides estimates of
equation (2) for each of our four sample cities for each city
tax base for which sufficient data are available.
III.

Data and Estimation

A. Data

Houston, Minneapolis, New York City, and Philadelphia each use the local property tax. The property tax
base per resident (B p ) is the aggregate market value per
resident of all taxable property within the city as estimated from each city’s tax roles using arm’s-length sales
of city properties. Minneapolis uses only a property tax.
Houston also uses a general sales tax, but there is
insufficient variation in the sales tax rate to estimate a
sales tax base equation.
In addition to the property tax, New York also uses a
general sales tax and a local income tax. New York City’s
sales tax base per resident (B s ) is the city’s reported
aggregate retail sales from establishment tax returns for
the given fiscal year. The city’s income tax base per
resident (B w ) uses the federal income tax definition of
taxable income and equals the fiscal year’s aggregate
taxable earned (wage) and unearned (investment) income
as reported by city residents.4
In addition to the property tax, Philadelphia also levies
a resident and a nonresident (commuter) wage tax, a
gross receipts tax on all business sales within the city,
and a 1% additional rate to the 6% statewide sales tax.
4 The income tax base for New York City is largely (75%) a wage tax
base; see Tax Revenue Forecasting Documentation: Financial Plan, FY
1994–98, City of New York, Office of Management and Budget, 1994.
Prior to 2000, New York City also imposed a nonresident income tax, but
its rates and revenues are low and its rate variation is insufficient for
empirical analysis.

Philadelphia does not separately report resident and nonresident wage tax bases on an annual basis; we therefore
use the aggregate resident plus nonresident wage tax base
denominated as base per resident (and denoted as B w⫹m ).
The Philadelphia gross receipts tax base per resident (B x )
is the city’s reported taxable receipts from business sales
within Philadelphia. There is insufficient variation over
time in the Philadelphia sales tax surcharge and the state
sales tax rate; thus, we could not estimate a sales tax base
equation for Philadelphia.
In all our cities, the city property tax rate ( p ) is the
effective average tax rate defined as the city’s proportional mill rate times the market-value-weighted average
rate of property assessment within the city.5. Statutory tax
rates are used for the resident income and sales taxes in
New York City and for the wage and gross receipt taxes
in Philadelphia. New York City’s income tax is a progressive tax; we define  w for purposes of our analysis as
the city’s top marginal income tax rate. Using the top
statutory rate as our measure of  w avoids a direct source
of simultaneity in our estimated base equations. Since our
measure of Philadelphia’s wage tax base is the sum of
resident and commuter taxable wages, we use a weighted
average of the two rates (denoted as  w⫹m ) as the city’s
wage tax rate.6 Importantly, there is significant variation,
both up and down, in each of our city’s local tax rates
over our sample years; see appendix A.
An important issue for the estimation of the causal
effects of tax rates on city tax base will be the exogeneity
of changes in the city’s tax rates. We want to rule out the
possibility that any observed correlation between rates
and base is due to reverse causation, that is, where strong
local economies permit rate reductions and weak economies require rate increases. Our analysis uses three alternative identification strategies. First, for all taxes,
there is a 10- to 12-month lag between the announcement
of changes in city tax rates and our measured realizations
of changes in city tax bases. Rate decisions for each fiscal
year are made in the spring prior to the July 1 start of that
new fiscal year. Our measures of city base, however, are
from data reported at the end of each fiscal year after all
tax bases and revenues have been officially recorded.
Therefore, within our data is a “natural” 1-year lag
between the announcement of a fiscal year’s tax rate and
the realization of that fiscal year’s tax base. If local
5 Houston, Minneapolis, and New York City have different classes of
property with different effective tax rates for each class. For these cities
we create a single tax-based weighted average of the separate property tax
rates as our measure of  p . The ratios of assessment to market value are
based upon market value as estimated from an annual sample of arm’slength sales of market properties.
6 The Philadelphia wage tax rate used to explain the aggregate resident
plus nonresident wage tax base is a weighted average of the resident ( w )
and nonresident ( m ) wage tax rates, specified as  w⫹m ⫽ 0.7 w ⫹ 0.3 m ,
where the weights were provided by the Philadelphia Department of
Revenue, based on periodic surveys. We thank Mr. Michael Isard for these
data.
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economic actors react to rather than anticipate local rate
changes, then ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
using our 1-year lagged rates will identify the causal
effect of rates on base. Second, for New York City and
Philadelphia, sales and income tax rates are set not by
city politicians but by state legislators and state politics.
The well-publicized but largely unsuccessful efforts by
Mayor Bloomberg in the winter of 2003 to persuade the
New York State legislature to increase city income tax
rates illustrate the importance of state politics to changes
in city rates. If state decisions on local tax rates are
determined by statewide political events uncorrelated
with the year-to-year variation in the New York City and
Philadelphia local economies, then even if local actors
anticipate these rate changes, the OLS estimates will still
identify the causal effect of rates on base. Finally, we use
an instrumental variable (IV) methodology to identify the
plausibly exogenous determinants of changes in local
rates, where the instruments are exogenous national or
state-level fiscal events likely to influence changes in
local tax rates but thought to be uncorrelated with contemporaneous changes in the city’s local economy.
In addition to local tax rates, other independent variables in each tax base equation include: exogenous nonmatching federal and state grants-in-aid to the city (including school aid) minus net spending by the city on
welfare services (Z); 7 exogenous determinants of the cost
of local public goods (c) measured by changes in the
national industrial producer price index (1994 ⫽ $1.00);
interest rates (r) measured by the AAA corporate borrowing rate; nonresident wages (q) measured by national
(not an endogenous local) average hourly earnings in
nonagricultural industries; and the national (not the endogenous local) rate of unemployment (UE) and the
national (not the endogenous local) rate of violent crime
(CRIME) as measures of the relative attractiveness to
city residents of moving to other locations (V 0 ). 8
Exogenous economic or policy events should also be
included in our analysis to control for possible omitted
variable bias. National economic events thought to impact the local economy include the annual change in real
oil prices [⌬OILP, from Rich and Raymond (1997)] for
Houston, in real national farm income (⌬FARMY) for
Minneapolis, in the deflated Dow-Jones Industrial Average (⌬DOW) for New York City, and in real national
7 Since the mobile middle class and firms determine land values and
wages within the city, we use only exogenous aid which can be allocated
to middle class and/or business services. Thus city welfare spending is
subtracted from total exogenous grants-in-aid.
8 City-specific annual crime rates for our sample cities and their surrounding suburbs are not available on a consistent basis over our sample
years. Cullen and Levitt (1999) have examined the effects of crime on city
economies using decade-to-decade changes in city-specific crime rates to
explain decade-to-decade changes in city population, and they find significant negative effects, particularly for upper-income and educated
households, of city crime on city population in their sample of 127 large
U.S. cities.
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health care spending (⌬HEXP) for Philadelphia. Policy
events thought to impact our cities include a large infusion of state economic development construction by Minnesota (STADIUM, for Minneapolis) and the adoption of
new state income taxes by New Jersey (NJITX, for both
New York City and Philadelphia) and by Connecticut
(CTITX, for New York City). We will also test for any
additional influence of national mayoral reputation on
city tax base (Giuliani in New York City and Rendell in
Philadelphia). Appendix A summarizes all data for our
four cities.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (available upon request)
reveal each of our national and city time series is a firstorder integrated [I(1)] process. Given these results, all
equations are estimated in first differences. We also tested
for the possibility of pooling our four sample cities to obtain
more precise estimates of the effects of tax rates on base, at
least for property taxation, which all four cities use. We
reject pooling as a preferred estimation strategy for our four
cities.9 Therefore, all base equations are estimated separately for each city.
B. Estimation: Core OLS Results

Tables 1–3 present our core estimates of the effects of
changes in city tax rates on changes in city tax base. Table
1 specifies changes in the property tax base per resident
(⌬B p ) as a function of a constant term, balanced-budget
changes in current and lagged city effective property tax
rates (⌬ p ), the national rate of unemployment (⌬UE),
federal and state aid (including school aid) to the city net of
welfare spending (⌬Z), and the national rate of violent
crime (⌬CRIME). In this first-difference specification, the
constant term measures the average annual rate of growth in
each city tax base.
In all four cities, ⌬ p has a statistically significant and
quantitatively important negative effect on the rate of
change of the city’s property tax base, and the effect is
felt within the fiscal year of the rate change. An F-test for
the statistical significance of lagged rate changes shows
lagged changes to be statistically insignificant for Houston and New York and only marginally significant in
Minneapolis and Philadelphia; see table 1. The insignificance of lags longer than one fiscal year suggests that the
primary effect of changes in city property tax rates is an
impact capitalization effect on the value of existing
housing and business structures, rather than a longer-run
investment effect.
Table 1 also reports the effects of broader national
trends on property values in the cities. Cyclical swings in
9 A pooled regression regressing ⌬B on a constant term, ⌬ , ⌬UE,
p
p
⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME has an unadjusted R 2 ⫽ 0.28. The pooled regression
of ⌬B p on city-specific constants and each variable interacted with a
city-specific indicator has an unadjusted R 2 ⫽ 0.53. An F-test for the
significance of all interaction terms as a test of validity of pooling rejects
the null hypothesis of pooling at the 0.02 level of significance: F 15,74 ⫽
2.507. Significant interactions were observed for all tax rates.
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TABLE 1.—PROPERTY TAXATIONa
Houston
⌬B p

Constant
⌬ p
⌬ p (⫺1)

⌬B p

793.2
(635.7)
⫺14,116.2*
(5,565.0)
—
—

—

⌬ p (⫺3)

—

—

⌬UE

—

⌬Z

—

⌬CRIME

—

ε B,
F(⌬(⫺3))
(p-value)

⌬B p

845.1
(618.3)
⫺11,995.5*
(5,488.2)
—

⌬ p (⫺2)

D.W.
R 2

Minneapolis

493.8
(567.0)
24.0
(22.2)
⫺39.5*
(17.5)
1.25
0.31
⫺0.76*
(0.35)
—

1.32
0.16
⫺0.89*
(0.35)
—

⌬B p

1006.3
(868.2)
⫺15,657.5*
(7,085.1)
⫺1,771.3
(6,464.7)
5,348.3
(5,833.9)
⫺5,785.4
(5,911.5)
703.7
(654.9)
16.3
(25.6)
⫺47.8*
(22.1)
1.18
0.27
⫺1.13
(0.82)
1.05
(0.39)

New York

⌬B p

914.8*
(237.1)
⫺2,402.0*
(920.1)
—

⌬B p

951.9*
(218.1)
⫺2,484.6*
(865.0)
—

—

—

—

—

—

166.0
(238.0)
2.6
(1.9)
⫺14.9*
(6.6)
1.50
0.32
⫺0.17*
(0.06)
—

—
—
1.24
0.18
⫺0.16*
(0.06)
—

⌬B p

919.0*
(243.1)
⫺1,609.2
(1,256.2)
⫺2,100.1
(1,241.4)
⫺963.8
(1,096.3)
⫺560.0
(967.0)
⫺187.3
(354.4)
1.0
(2.1)
⫺14.3
(7.3)
2.03
0.33
⫺0.36*
(0.11)
2.06
(0.14)

Philadelphia

⌬B p

⌬B p

⫺13.6
(303.8)
⫺10,532.4*
(1,487.3)
—

102.7
(289.1)
⫺10,660.9*
(1,420.5)
—
—

—

—

—

—

212.2
(329.9)
1.4
(1.4)
7.7
(9.9)
1.42
0.61
⫺0.76*
(0.11)
—

—
—
1.11
0.61
⫺0.77*
(0.10)
—

⌬B p

14.7
(301.7)
⫺9,785.7*
(1,694.8)
⫺756.5
(1,828.8)
1,224.7
(1,963.4)
⫺3,188.5
(1,778.0)
185.8
(334.7)
0.4
(1.6)
10.3
(10.1)
1.31
0.61
⫺0.90*
(0.15)
1.18
(0.33)

⌬B p

72.5
(127.3)
⫺3,129.1*
(599.4)
—

⌬B p

47.5
(144.0)
⫺3,079.9*
(615.0)
—

—

—

—

—

—

⫺179.9
(136.0)
0.1
(1.9)
5.3
(4.3)
1.77
0.47
⫺0.41*
(0.08)
—

—
—
1.49
0.47
⫺0.41*
(0.08)
—

47.5
(144.0)
⫺2,965.7*
(688.4)
⫺35.3
(757.1)
⫺1,538.4*
(723.5)
⫺1,470.2
(674.3)
⫺202.0
(137.5)
⫺0.2
(2.4)
6.9
(4.6)
2.02
0.53
⫺0.80*
(0.23)
2.44
(0.09)

a Standard errors for each estimated coefficient are reported within parentheses. D.W. is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation. R
 2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom.
The elasticity of tax base with respect to tax rate (ε B, ) is based on the marginal effect of rates on the tax base, calculated for the most recent fiscal year’s tax base and tax rate for each city. Elasticities reported
in columns with lagged rate changes are for the longer run. F(⌬(⫺3)) is the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that three lagged changes in rates jointly have no influence on change in tax base.
* Coefficient’s t-statistic ⱖ2.00.

the national economy as measured by ⌬UE have no
important effects on property values, though, as we will
see in table 2, ⌬UE does affect jobs and sales by
businesses in the cities. Holding property tax rates fixed,
an increase in federal or state transfers to the city (⌬Z)
means additional public spending. If this additional
spending is permanent and benefits property owners, then

⌬Z should be capitalized into higher values. We find no
evidence of favorable capitalization.
Changes in the national rate of violent crimes (⌬CRIME),
which varied significantly over our sample period and is highly
correlated with urban crime rates, should also be capitalized
into local property values. This is the case for Houston and
Minneapolis, where the estimated elasticity of property values

TABLE 2.—SALES, GROSS RECEIPTS,
Sales: New York
⌬B s
Constant
⌬ s ; ⌬ x
⌬ s (⫺1); ⌬ x (⫺1)

52.9
(75.4)
⫺1,262.0*
(241.3)
—

⌬B s
24.3
(79.1)
⫺1,144.1*
(259.5)
—

⌬ s (⫺2); ⌬ x (⫺2)

—

—

⌬ w ; ⌬ w⫹m

—

—

⌬ w (⫺1);
⌬ w⫹m (⫺1)

—

—

⌬ w (⫺2);
⌬ w⫹m (⫺2)

—

⌬UE

—

⌬Z

—

⌬CRIME

—

D.W.
R 2
ε B,
F(⌬(⫺2))
(p-value)

1.35
0.40
⫺0.52*
(0.10)
—

AND INCOME

TAXATIONa

Gross Receipts: Philadelphia
⌬B s
27.0
(84.0)
⫺1,226.6*
(275.3)
165.3
(262.1)
⫺213.6
(253.5)
—

⌬B x
349.5*
(166.5)
⫺18,701.3*
(3,672.4)
—

⌬B x
471.0*
(184.9)
⫺16,937.3*
(3,627.5)
—

Income: New York
⌬B x

512.5*
(190.7)
⫺16,734.9*
(4,228.2)
⫺1,506.9
(4,837.0)
⫺5,857.7
(4,487.1)
—

Wage: Philadelphia

⌬B w

⌬B w

⌬B w

⌬B w⫹m

380.7
(207.0)
—

384.6
(209.3)
—

397.7
(200.4)
—

114.9
(67.2)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

⌬B w⫹m

⌬B w⫹m

103.4
(70.6)
—

96.3
(74.6)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

⫺210.3
(235.9)

⫺182.9
(242.5)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1,014.5
(511.1)

—

—

232.8
(258.8)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

⫺158.1
(88.7)
0.4
(0.4)
0.3
(2.5)
1.11
0.41
⫺0.47*
(0.11)
—

⫺146.0
(91.0)
0.5
(0.4)
0.22
(2.6)
1.03
0.40
⫺0.50*
(0.20)
0.58
(0.56)

—

⫺312.3
(177.6)
⫺1.8
(2.2)
⫺7.3
(5.2)
2.28
0.49
⫺0.19*
(0.04)
—

⫺347.2
(183.9)
⫺2.7
(2.4)
⫺8.5
(5.6)
2.28
0.49
⫺0.27*
(0.12)
0.96
(0.39)

—

⫺286.1
(236.6)
0.15
(1.0)
⫺7.0
(6.5)
2.49
0.41
⫺0.47*
(0.12)
—

⫺837.4
(563.0)
⫺347.8
(226.5)
0.2
(1.0)
⫺7.3
(6.0)
2.48
0.49
⫺0.46*
(0.20)
2.89
(0.07)

⫺35.4
(267.0)
⫺142.5*
(66.6)
0.5
(0.9)
⫺1.8
(2.4)
1.47
0.12
⫺0.004
(0.14)
0.46
(0.64)

—
—
1.94
0.44
⫺0.21*
(0.04)
—

⫺2,480.2*
(543.4)

—
—
2.51
0.41
⫺0.53*
(0.11)
—

⫺2,172.6*
(569.7)

⫺2,297.3*
(531.6)

⫺225.7
(252.9)

⫺147.0*
(63.6)
0.7
(0.9)
—
⫺1.3
(2.0)
1.37
1.53
⫺0.01
0.15
⫺0.06
⫺0.06
(0.07)
(0.07)
—
—
—

a Standard errors for each estimated coefficient are reported within parentheses. D.W. is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation. R
 2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom.
The elasticity of tax base with respect to tax rate (ε B, ) is based on the marginal effect of rates on the tax base, calculated for the most recent fiscal year’s tax base and tax rate for each city. Elasticities reported
in columns with lagged rate changes are for the longer run. F(⌬(⫺2)) is the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that two lagged changes in rates jointly have no influence on change in tax base.
* Coefficient’s t-statistic ⱖ2.00.
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TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED OWN

AND

CROSS TAX RATE ELASTICITIESa

New York

⌬ p
⌬ s
⌬ w
⌬ p

575

Philadelphia

⌬B p

⌬B s

⌬B w

⫺.81*
(.11)
.04
(.09)
.09
(.05)

.05
(.09)
⫺.22*
(.08)
⫺.04
(.04)

⫺.18
(.24)
⫺.13
(.35)
⫺.45*
(.13)

⌬ x
⌬ w⫹m

⌬B p

⌬B x

⌬B w⫹m

⫺.56*
(.10)
.50
(.37)
.21
(.11)

.01
(.01)
⫺.19*
(.04)
⫺.01
(.01)

⫺.11
(.11)
.06
(.40)
⫺.06
(.12)

a Estimated elasticities of each tax base to a corresponding rate change (standard errors in parentheses). Each ⌬B equation includes the changes in all three tax rates as well as ⌬UE, ⌬Z and ⌬CRIME as
independent variables. Elasticities are calculated for the most recent fiscal year’s tax base and tax rate for each city.
* Estimated elasticity’s t-statistic ⱖ 2.00.

with respect to the national crime rate is ⫺0.50 (s.e. ⫽ 0.22)
for Houston, and ⫺0.27 (s.e. ⫽ 0.12) for Minneapolis. We find
no effect of changes in national crime rates on New York City
and Philadelphia property values.10
Table 1 also reports the estimated elasticity of cities’
property tax bases with respect to changes in their property
tax rates. All reported elasticities are computed for the most
recent year in each city sample. When lagged rates are
included, the reported elasticity is the implied longer-run
elasticity. Houston and New York, and Philadelphia after
three years, show base elasticities which are statistically
indistinguishable from ⫺1. Barring significant cross-base
effects (see table 3), these three cities are very close to the
top of their respective revenue hills, at least along the path
marked “Property Taxation.” Minneapolis is safely below
the peak of its revenue hill. See figure 1 below.
The estimates in table 1 allow us to infer the efficiency of
a marginal dollar of city property taxation, at least from the
perspective of city property owners. As specified by equation (2) above and as estimated in table 1, the effect of rate
changes on property values provides an estimate of the joint
effect on city property values of changes in city tax rates and
associated spending. The impact (first-year) effect of the tax
and spending increase provides an estimate of the capitalized net benefits of taxation for city residents and firms.11
The market value (MV) of city property is defined as
the discounted stream of market rents (R): MV ⫽ R/r.
Rents equal the rents paid for the “private” attributes of
the property (R pr) plus the annual benefits of the public
services provided at the location less the property taxes
10 We also tested for the effects of changes in local public good costs
(⌬c), national interest rates (⌬r), and—for Philadelphia—nonresident
wages (⌬q) on changes in local property values; individually or as a
group, these variables were generally statistically insignificant, and their
inclusion left the estimated effect of tax rates on tax base unaffected.
11 There is the question of whether households and firms interpret our
observed tax rate changes as temporary or permanent. If temporary, we
should expect the estimated coefficients in the tax base equations to be
approximately 0. The fact that we find significant coefficients suggest
taxpayers view these as permanent changes affecting future economic
rents.

paid on the property (T p ): R ⯝ R pr ⫹ G ⫺ T p , where
 is a dollar measure of a property owner’s benefit from
local services (G). Assuming a (locally) linear technology
relating services received to taxes paid, G ⫽ ⌽T p , then
R ⯝ R pr ⫹ (⌽ ⫺ 1)T p , where ⌽ ⫺ 1 represents the net
benefit of an additional dollar of local taxation. Further,
T p ⫽  p 䡠 MV. A small increase ⌬ p in the property tax rate,
applied to the city’s current tax base MV 0 , yields an initial
increase in property tax revenues of ⌬T p ⫽ ⌬ p 䡠 MV 0 ,
which is then available for public spending. For this
small rate increase, market values will then change by
⌬MV ⯝ [(⌽ ⫺ 1)/r] ⌬ p 䡠 MV 0 . Thus
⌽ ⫺ 1 ⯝

⌬MV r
䡠
.
⌬ p MV 0

Knowing MV 0 and r, and using our econometric estimates
of ⌬MV/⌬ p , we can estimate ⌽ ⫺ 1, and finally ⌽ as a
measure of the annual gross benefits of a marginal dollar of
taxation to a local property owner.
For the estimates reported here we use the average real
rate of interest over our sample period, equal to 3.00%
(since  p is measured as a percentage in our regressions, so
too must r), MV 0 is set at the sample mean market value for
each city, and ⌬MV/⌬ p is set equal to the estimated impact
effect on the city tax property tax base of increases in  p .
From table 1, for Houston, ⌬MV/⌬ p ⫽ ⫺11,995 (s.e. ⫽
5,488); for Minneapolis, ⫺2,485 (s.e. ⫽ 865); for New York
City, ⫺10,532 (s.e. ⫽ 1,488); and for Philadelphia, ⫺3,080
(s.e. ⫽ 615). Upon substitution, we obtain ⌽ ⫽ 0.21
(s.e. ⫽ 0.36) for Houston; ⌽ ⫽ 0.77 (s.e. ⫽ 0.08) for
Minneapolis; ⌽ ⫽ ⫺0.16 (s.e. ⫽ .16) for New York City;
and ⌽ ⫽ 0.43 (s.e. ⫽ 0.11) for Philadelphia. The null
hypothesis that the marginal dollar of local property taxation over our sample period generated a dollar of compensating gross benefits—that is, ⌽ ⫽ 1—is clearly rejected
for all four of our sample cities, strikingly so for New York
City. Likely recipients of the marginal dollar of city spending other than city property owners include low-income
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households, public employees through inefficient labor contracts, and, in the case of New York City, prior city residents
and retired public employees because of city deficits and
underfunded pensions from the 1960s and early 1970s being
repaid over most of our sample period as Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) debt.12
Table 2 provides estimates of the effects of own tax rates
on the tax base for sales and income taxation in New York
City and on gross receipts and wage taxation in Philadelphia, again controlling for annual growth via the constant
term, and for ⌬UE, ⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME. 13 For New York
City, increases in both the city’s sales ( s ) and income tax
rates ( w ) have statistically and quantitatively important
negative effects upon their respective tax bases. Lagged
effects are not significant economically. The estimated elasticities of base with respect to changes in own rates range
from ⫺0.47 to ⫺0.52 for New York sales taxation and from
⫺0.46 to ⫺0.53 for New York City income taxation; see
table 2. Recessionary swings in the national macroeconomy
(⌬UE) lower New York’s sales and income tax bases,
though the effects are not quite statistically significant.
Changes in the rate of national crime (⌬CRIME) and
exogenous aid (⌬Z) have no important effects on the city
jobs or sales.
For Philadelphia, increases in the city’s gross receipts
tax rate ( x ) reduce overall business activity in the city.
There are no important lag effects. The estimated rateto-base elasticity ranges from ⫺0.19 to ⫺0.27. As in New
York, recessionary swings in the national macroeconomy
(⌬UE) hurt the Philadelphia economy, whereas changes
in the national rate of crime (⌬CRIME) or federal and
state aid to the city (⌬Z) again have no significant effects.
In contrast to New York, however, Philadelphia’s wage
tax base per resident shows little overall sensitivity to
changes in the city’s weighted average wage tax rate on
residents and nonresidents. The effect is small and always
statistically insignificant. This result does not mean the
city’s wage tax is without economic consequences, however. We show below (table 5) that the small elasticity is
the result of two offsetting real side effects: changes in
the city’s wage tax rate change jobs and population in
roughly the same proportions. Thus the wage tax base per
resident remains unchanged, even though increases in
city wage tax rates significantly reduce the overall size of
Philadelphia’s economy.14
12 For additional evidence consistent with these results for larger samples of other local governments, see Vigdor (1998), Gyourko and Tracy
(1989), Glaeser and Kahn (1999), and Haughwout and Inman (2002).
Fuchs (1992) and Shefter (1992) provide excellent case studies of New
York City’s spending during this period.
13 Again we tested for the possible effects of changes in public service
costs (⌬c), interest rates (⌬r), and nonresident wages (⌬q), and again
these variables proved statistically insignificant.
14 In a separate study of Philadelphia’s wage tax base, our colleague
Richard Voith (2002) uses changes in the city’s aggregate wage tax base
as the dependent variable and, consistent with our conclusion here, finds

Finally, table 3 reports own and cross tax rate impact (one
fiscal year) elasticities for New York City and Philadelphia,
based upon a first-difference specification including all local
tax rates, a constant term, ⌬UE, ⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME. Only
the tax rate elasticities are reported in table 3. Estimation is
by OLS, equivalent to generalized least squares in this case.
Estimates of each tax rate’s own impact elasticity are similar
in magnitude and statistical significance to those reported in
tables 1 and 2. The estimated cross elasticities are generally
small and always statistically insignificant. In the analysis
which follows we focus on own tax rate elasticities only.
C. Robustness

We provide two checks of robustness for our core results.
The first panel of table 4 presents IV estimates for the
effects of ⌬ i on ⌬B i . Also reported are the F-tests for the
explanatory power of the instruments from the stage I ⌬ i
regressions. The results reported in the second panel of table
4 repeat the core OLS estimates for the effects of ⌬ i on
⌬B i , but now each ⌬B i equation includes, in addition to
⌬UE, ⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME, other potentially important economic or policy events thought to impact city tax bases.
For IV estimation, stage I instruments used to identify
changes in local rates include exogenous local political
events thought to change the players or preferences setting
local rates, as well as exogenous state and national fiscal
policies thought to change the overall attractiveness of local
spending or the relative attractiveness of different local
taxes. Valid instruments must be significant determinants of
local tax rate changes and also be uncorrelated with changes
in the local tax base, except through changes in the local tax
rate.
In our four sample cities, property tax rates are decided
by local politicians. Instruments used to predict changes in
local property tax rates include the local election cycle
(Levitt, 1997), unexpected changes in statewide aid to all
local governments, changes in the state share of state and
local government spending, state-legislated changes in the
ratio of residential to commercial property assessment rates
(Minneapolis), the increase in minority representation on a
city council following the 1980 arrest and conviction of city
council members for influence peddling (Philadelphia), a
1977 audit of Mayor Rizzo’s pre-election-year budget by
the research staff of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank
revealing a sizable postelection fiscal deficit (Philadelphia),
and the 1985 state-mandated reforms of local business
taxation (Philadelphia).
For New York City and Philadelphia, changes in income,
sales, wage, and gross receipt tax rates require approval of
the state legislature. These rate changes should be viewed as
an outcome of a state-city fiscal bargain; it is not uncommon
that city requests for rate changes are denied. Instruments
a significant negative effect of tax rate changes on changes in the total tax
base.
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TABLE 4.—SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Houston

Minneapolis

⌬B p

⌬B p

New York
⌬B p

⌬B s
IV

⌬
ε B,
F for stage I
instruments

Philadelphia
⌬B w

⌬B p

⌬B x

⌬B w⫹m

Estimatesa

⫺17,753.5*
(8,327.1)
⫺1.12*
(0.52)

⫺2,096.4
(1,545.7)
⫺0.14
(0.11)

⫺8,976.6*
(3,456.2)
⫺0.65*
(0.25)

⫺2,263.1*
(1,096.4)
⫺0.94*
(0.45)

⫺2,431.0*
(1,022.0)
⫺0.52*
(0.22)

3.08
(0.04)

4.31
(0.02)

3.60
(0.01)

3.46
(0.04)

2.35
(0.11)

⫺2,358.4*
(926.1)
⫺0.31*
(0.12)
9.01
(0.001)

⫺19,737.6*
(8,646.1)
⫺0.22*
(0.10)
2.78
(0.06)

⫺133.5
(316.5)
⫺0.04
(0.09)
7.02
(0.001)

Economic and Policy Shocksb
⌬
ε B,
Economic
shocks:
Policy
shocks:

⫺15,786.6*
(5,195.4)
⫺1.00*
(0.33)

⫺2,759.8*
(878.7)
⫺0.19*
(0.06)

⫺10,369.9*
(1,393.6)
⫺0.75*
(0.10)

⫺1,188.1*
(271.0)
⫺0.49*
(0.11)

⫺2,297.0*
(678.7)
⫺0.50*
(0.15)

⌬OILP
6,933.7*
(2,439.4)

⌬FARMY
16.43
(14.11)

⌬DOW
⫺0.43
(0.54)

⌬DOW
0.001
(0.18)

⌬DOW
0.46
(0.50)

—

STADIUM
1,469.9
(1,234.8)

—

—

NJITX
5,221.1*
(1,688.0)
CTITX
5,011.1*
(1,566.2)

NJITX
7.25
(555.2)
CTITX
⫺790.8
(497.4)

NJITX
651.1
(1,557.9)
CTITX
⫺227.2
(1,249.0)

⫺3,218.3*
(535.6)
⫺0.43*
(0.07)
⌬HEXP
8.36*
(2.52)
NJITX
63.85
(688.4)
—

⫺16,963.0*
(3,683.2)
⫺0.19*
(0.04)
⌬HEXP
2.23
(3.77)
NJITX
⫺1,383.3
(1,025.6)
—

⫺222.9
(234.6)
⫺0.06
(0.07)
⌬HEXP
0.73
(1.39)
NJITX
⫺533.9
(378.3)
—

IV estimates based upon the IV estimation of each city’s tax rate; see appendix B. The p-value for F-statistic is in parentheses. The IV equations include ⌬UE, ⌬CRIME, and ⌬Z.
b See text for details. All economic and policy shock regressions also include ⌬UE, ⌬CRIME, and ⌬Z.
* Coefficient or elasticity’s t-statistic ⱖ2.00. Standard errors for each estimated coefficient are reported within parentheses.
a

used to predict changes in the New York City sales and
income tax rates include unexpected statewide aid to all
local governments, the passage of the 1986 federal Income
Tax Reform Act, and lagged state income tax rates. Instruments used to predict changes in Philadelphia’s gross receipts and wage tax rates include the 1977 audit revealing
sizable city budget deficits, the 1985 state-mandated reforms of local business taxation, and lagged state income
tax rates. See appendix B.
The F-tests reported in table 4 show that the instruments as a set work well in predicting changes in local
property tax rates but are perhaps less successful in
predicting rate changes for New York City income and
Philadelphia gross receipts taxation. The new literature
on weak instruments cautions that first-stage F-statistics
should be 3 or larger and ideally have values above 10;
see Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995, table A.1) and
Staiger and Stock (1997). The statistic (1/F) is an approximate estimate of the finite-sample bias of IV relative
to OLS estimators. Although our instruments for property
tax rate changes are reasonable by this criterion, our
instruments for New York City income tax rates and
Philadelphia wage and gross receipts tax rates should be
considered weak. When instruments are weak, the IV
instruments will fail to correct OLS bias if bias does
exist, and indeed may make matters worse if the instruments are even weakly correlated with the errors in the
stage II regression (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995). This
leads us to prefer the IV estimates for property taxation

and the original OLS estimates for the New York City
sales and income tax base equations and the Philadelphia
gross receipts and wage tax base equations. For these
OLS estimates we must rely upon an a priori belief that
the lagged specification for rates and/or the fact that state,
not local, politics determines rates is an appropriate basis
for identification of observed rate-to-base effects.
The second panel of table 4 tests the sensitivity of our
estimated tax base elasticities to the inclusion of cityspecific, but still exogenous, economic and policy events
omitted from our core regressions. For purposes of comparison with tables 1 and 2, the regressions are OLS and
continue to include a constant term, ⌬UE, ⌬Z, and
⌬CRIME as regressors. Included as additional exogenous
economic determinants of each city’s tax base are the
annual change in real oil prices (⌬OILP) for Houston;
the annual change in real farm incomes (⌬FARMY) for
Minneapolis; the annual change in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (⌬DOW) for New York City; and the annual
change in health care expenditures (⌬HEXP) for Philadelphia. Included as exogenous policy events are (1)
state-financed construction of the Metrodome sports stadium and the Minneapolis Convention Center for Minneapolis, represented by an indicator variable (STADIUM) equal to 1 for the first year of construction, 0
otherwise; and (2) the introduction of state income taxation in New Jersey in FY 1977 (for New York City and
Philadelphia) and in Connecticut in FY 1992 (for New
York only), measured respectively by indicator variables
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NJITX and CTITX equal to 1 for the fiscal year introducing the tax, 0 otherwise. We know of no comparable
exogenous policy events likely to have impacted the
Houston economy.
The inclusion of these additional economic and policy
event variables in our core OLS regressions does not
significantly affect our initial estimates of the rate-tobase elasticities as reported in tables 1 and 2. Also of
interest are the effects of the new variables themselves on
city tax bases. For two of our cities, Houston and Philadelphia, industry-specific changes in the national economy can make a significant difference to the city tax base.
In each case, the primary effect of industry shocks is to
change city property values, a result consistent with
predictions from a fully specified general equilibrium
model of open city economies where swings in the
demand for city products are capitalized into the value of
city land and structures; see Haughwout and Inman
(2001). From table 4, the implied elasticity of Houston’s
property tax base with respect to changes in the price of
oil (⌬OILP) is 0.26 (s.e. ⫽ 0.09). For Philadelphia the
implied elasticity of the city’s property tax base with
respect to changes in national health care spending
(⌬HEXP) is 0.95 (s.e. ⫽ 0.28). The tax bases in Minneapolis and New York City are not, however, much affected by our measures of national demand for city
outputs. Popular accounts aside, we find no evidence over
our 30-year sample period that swings in financial market
fortunes as measured by ⌬DOW have much impact on the
average value of the New York City tax bases.
What did matter for the New York City tax base were
the decisions by its neighboring states of New Jersey and
Connecticut to introduce state income taxes. Again, consistent with a general equilibrium specification of taxation in an open city economy, the primary effect is felt
through changes in city property values. New York City
property values received a one-time boost of about
$5,000/person from its regional competitors’ decisions to
introduce a state income tax.15 Philadelphia property
15 Are these effects too big? An example helps put our estimates in
perspective. New Jersey introduced a progressive tax on resident income
with rates ranging from 1.5% to 3%. An average 1977 family considering
living in New York City or northern New Jersey had an annual family
income of approximately $40,000 in 1994 dollars. This family faced a
New Jersey state income tax rate of approximately 3%. It could therefore
anticipate paying an additional $1,200/year in taxes, above what it might
have paid in FY 1976. Capitalizing this tax increase at a real interest rate
of 0.03 per annum implies a maximal increase in the value of New York
City land and structures of about $40,000 (⫽$1,200/0.03) per parcel, or
about $13,333/resident (assuming three residents per family). The estimated increase in value is $5,221/resident following the introduction of
the New Jersey income tax. New York City capitalization is therefore 37%
of maximal capitalization. Northern New Jersey property values no doubt
fell as well to restore residential equilibrium. A similar calculation for the
introduction of the Connecticut income tax gives a similar result. The
1991 Connecticut income tax rate was 1.5% but was understood to be
about to rise to 4% in 1992. For a New York City or Connecticut family
with the average income of $55,000 (1994 dollars) we use the expected
tax rate of 4% and an implied tax burden of $2,200/year. Capitalized at

values were not impacted by the New Jersey decision,
however.
We performed one final robustness check, whose results
are not shown here but which seems worth mentioning
briefly. In recent years, much has been made of America’s
new urban leadership as a catalyst for economic change.
Our sample includes the mayoral terms of two of the most
often heralded “new” urban leaders: Mayor Giuliani of New
York City and Mayor Rendell of Philadelphia. Perhaps the
favorable tax rate changes in our sample are correlated with
the terms of these particularly charismatic and effective
mayors, with the result that the estimated changes in tax
base are due to mayoral leadership style rather than fiscal
policy per se. We tested this possibility by including in our
core specifications an indicator variable equal to 1 for each
year of these mayors’ tenures, 0 otherwise. The mayoral
variables were always statistically insignificant, and our
core estimates of the rate-to-base elasticities were unaffected. We conclude that it is the mayor’s fiscal and economic policies and not their personalities that affect local
economies.
IV.

Taxes and City Jobs

As additional evidence for the effects of city taxes on city
tax base, table 5 provides estimates of the effects of changes
in city taxes and associated public spending on city jobs for
New York City and Philadelphia, the two cities in our
sample for which annual employment data are available.
Results are presented for changes in each city’s share of
national total employment, of national manufacturing employment (⫽ manufacturing ⫹ construction ⫹ communications ⫹ public utility ⫹ transportation employment), and of
national service employment (⫽ finance–insurance–real
estate ⫹ retail ⫹ wholesale ⫹ services ⫹ federal and state
government employment). Initial estimates showed that of
all our city tax rates, only changes in New York City’s
income tax rate (measured as the top marginal rate) and
Philadelphia’s wage tax rate (measured as the weighted
average of resident and nonresident rates) were statistically
significant and quantitatively important determinants of
each city’s shares of national jobs. OLS results are reported
in table 5; IV results are similar (though less precise) and are
available upon request.
In 1970 New York City had 5.28% of the nation’s jobs;
today (2001) the city’s share is 2.88%. As demonstrated
by the negative constant terms in each of New York
City’s employment share equations there has been a
0.03 per annum, this implies an increase in value of city land and
structures of $73,333, or $24,444/resident (assuming three residents per
family). The estimated increase in value is $5,011/resident following the
introduction of the Connecticut income tax. New York City capitalization
is estimated to be 22% of maximal capitalization. Again, maximal capitalization is a likely upper bound to the potential changes in New York
City property values; for Connecticut provided state services and local aid
with the additional state revenues, and western Connecticut property
values also adjusted downward.

LOCAL REVENUE HILLS: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR U.S. CITIES
TABLE 5.—TAXATION

AND JOB

579

LOCATIONa
⌬JOBSHARE

New York
Total
Constant
⌬ w , ⌬ w⫹m
⌬ w (⫺1), ⌬ w⫹m (⫺1)
⌬ w (⫺2), ⌬ w⫹m (⫺2)
D.W.
R 2
SR
εShare,
(s.e.)
LR
εShare,
(s.e.)

⫺.000701
(.000404)
⫺.000525*
(.000184)
⫺.000568*
(.000195)
⫺.000361
(.000183)
1.36
0.767
⫺0.06*
(0.02)
⫺0.16*
(0.05)

Manufacturing
⫺.000698*
(.000191)
⫺.000620*
(.000227)
⫺.000701*
(.000235)
⫺.000622*
(.000226)
1.82
0.620
⫺0.10*
(0.04)
⫺0.31*
(0.08)

Philadelphia
Services
⫺.000890
(.000577)
⫺.000450
(.000232)
⫺.000415
(.000247)
.000051
(.000231)
1.53
0.701
⫺0.04
(0.02)
⫺0.09
(0.06)

Total
⫺.000244*
(.000057)
⫺.000262*
(.000100)
⫺.000299*
(.000088)
⫺.000087
(.000073)
1.91
0.580
⫺0.14*
(0.06)
⫺0.36*
(0.11)

Manufacturing
⫺.000248*
(.000092)
⫺.000101
(.000127)
⫺.000244*
(.000117)
⫺.000184*
(.000089)
2.00
0.625
⫺0.07
(0.09)
⫺0.39
(0.21)

Services
⫺.000272*
(.000056)
⫺.000290*
(.000111)
⫺.000288*
(.000089)
⫺.000001
(.000008)
2.05
0.428
⫺0.14*
(0.05)
⫺0.29*
(0.10)

a Each ⌬JOBSHARE OLS equation includes ⌬UE, ⌬CRIME, and ⌬Z as independent variables. Standard errors for each estimated coefficient are reported within parentheses. D.W. is the Durbin-Watson test
statistic for serial correlation. R 2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom. The elasticity of city job share with respect to changes in the city income or wage tax is calculated for the first
SR
LR
year of the new tax rate as the impact elasticity (εShare,
) and as the longer-run elasticity after three fiscal years of the new tax rate (εShare,
). All elasticities are calculated at sample means.
* Coefficient’s or elasticity’s t-statistic ⱖ2.00.

steady secular trend away from city jobs. Compounding
the secular loss in job shares have been increases in the
city’s income tax rates over the past thirty years, rising
from a top marginal rate of 2.00% to 4.66% in 1994, then
falling in a sequence of three reductions to 3.592% by
2001, the last year in our sample. The estimates in table
5 show a statistically significant negative effect of these
rate changes on the city’s share of national jobs, reducing
the city’s job share when rates rise and increasing it when
rates fall. Simulating the path of city jobs using the
estimated equation in table 5 shows New York City lost
331,338 jobs by 2001 because of these increases in city
income tax rates, roughly 8.7% of total city jobs in 2001.
The loss of jobs would have been much larger—487,913
jobs—had the city not cut tax rates beginning in 1994.16
Because the city is still on the rising portion of its income
tax revenue hill, however, the approximately 150,000
jobs saved because of the rate cut did cost the city income
tax revenues. For New York City, our results suggest the
present value of lost city revenues for each job created
will be approximately $146,233/job.17
16 To calculate the contribution of New York City tax increases to the
decline in the city’s share of national jobs, we used the results reported
in table 5 to simulate a predicted path of the city’s job share, first with
and then without the actual tax rate changes from 1971 to 2001. The
difference between the two job share paths is our estimate of the effect
of city tax rate changes on the city’s employment share. The predicted
job shares are then multiplied by the national total number of jobs in
2001 to calculate the city total number of jobs with and without tax rate
changes.
17 The marginal revenue costs of a new job can be estimated as
⌬Revenue/⌬Jobs, where ⌬Revenue ⫽ Revenue 䡠 (1 ⫹ ε B, )(⌬ /)
and where ⌬Jobs ⫽ Jobs 䡠 ε N⫹M, 䡠 (⌬ /). Since we use the baseadjusted elasticities to estimate the effects of rate reductions on revenues,
the estimates of revenue costs will be net of the additional revenues made
available by the new jobs. Using New York City’s 2001 values for income
tax revenues (⫽$608/resident) and city jobs (⫽0.46 jobs/resident), and the
OLS estimates for ε B, (⫽ ⫺0.47: table 2) and ε N⫹M, (⫽ ⫺0.16: table
5), we estimate the annual revenue loss per new city job to be ⫺$4,378/

Philadelphia’s share of national jobs has declined from
1.24% in 1971 to 0.52% by 2001. Here too the negative
and significant constant term in the share equations
shows the secular trend in jobs away from the Philadelphia economy. Over our sample period, the city’s
weighted average wage tax rate rose from 3.00% in 1971
to a peak of 4.766% in 1995. Since 1996, the wage tax
rate has been reduced to the current (2001) weighted
average rate of 4.384%. The estimates in table 5 show a
statistically significant negative effect of these rate
changes on the city’s job share.18 We estimate that between 1971 and 2001 Philadelphia lost 172,889 jobs
because of the increase in city wage tax rates; without the
wage tax rate cuts begun in FY 1996 the loss (again, in
2001) would have been instead 202,291 jobs.19 By our
job. Because the local tax cut must be permanent to be credible, we
calculate the present value of all future annual revenue losses as the cost
of a job created. Assuming a 3% real interest rate, this equals $146,233/job
(⫽$4,387/0.03).
18 The contrast between the strong negative effect of Philadelphia’s wage
tax rate on city jobs shown in table 5 and that same rate’s insignificant
effect on the city’s wage tax base per resident shown in table 2 deserves
comment. The explanation for these contrasting results lies in the negative
effect that a higher city wage tax rate also has on city population. A precise
estimate of the effects of city taxes on city population is impossible
because we lack an accurate annual population series, but decade-todecade changes in Philadelphia’s share of the national population regressed on a constant term and on decade-to-decade changes in the city’s
wage tax rate show a significant negative elasticity of population with
respect to tax rates: ⫺0.27 (s.e. ⫽ 0.17). Given that the estimated
elasticity of Philadelphia jobs with respect to the wage tax rate is ⫺0.36
(table 5), we see both jobs and residents leave the city at roughly the same
rate as the city wage tax rate rises. Philadelphia’s wage tax base per
resident is therefore unchanged (table 2), though the city and its economy
are both significantly smaller (table 5).
19 To calculate the contribution of Philadelphia tax increases to the
decline in the city’s share of national jobs, we first used the results of table
5 to simulate the path of the city’s job share for the actual rate changes
between 1971 and 2001. We then simulated the path of the city’s job share,
holding the tax rate fixed at its 1971 value (3.00%). The difference of the
two series provides our estimate of the effect of tax rate changes on the
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measures, the programmed reduction in city wage tax
rates begun by Mayor Rendell in 1996 and continued
under the current Mayor Street saved the city 29,402
jobs. Again, since the city is on the rising portion of its
wage tax revenue hill, these rate reductions lead to a fall
in city revenue. We estimate the present-value revenue
loss per job created to be $133,583.20
Should New York City and Philadelphia use income and
wage tax cuts to create jobs? While our estimates of the present
value revenue costs of each job created are large, city officials
must appreciate that these revenue losses are not the economic
costs of creating new jobs in the city through tax cuts. City
revenues lost are private incomes gained, in this case by city
residents and firms. The true economic costs of city job
creation using tax cuts equals the marginal net benefit of a
dollar of city spending lost because of loss of city revenues.
Our estimates in section IIIB above suggest that the marginal
net benefits of city spending for property owners in New York
and Philadelphia are well below 1, and for all city residents—
property owners, city employees, and lower-income households—probably no larger than 1. If so, then incremental cuts
in New York and Philadelphia income and wage tax rates
create new jobs in the city at no net economic cost to the
average city resident. The end result is a smaller public sector,
but a larger, and arguably more productive, private city economy; see Inman (2003).
V.

Local Revenue Hills

Figure 1 presents each city’s revenues hills. Estimates of
property tax revenue hills use the IV estimates of each city’s
⌬Bp equation, controlling for ⌬UE, ⌬Z, ⌬CRIME, and each
city’s significant economic and policy events. Estimates of
New York City’s sales and income tax revenue hills use OLS
estimates of the city’s ⌬Bs and ⌬Bw equations, controlling for
⌬UE, ⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME. Estimates of Philadelphia’s gross
receipts and wage tax revenue hills use OLS estimates of the
city’s ⌬Bx and ⌬Bw⫹m equations, again controlling for ⌬UE,
⌬Z, and ⌬CRIME. Each hill is evaluated for current (FY 2001)
city tax rates and revenues; all dollar figures are reported in
1994 dollars.21 Four conclusions seem evident.
city’s job share. The predicted tax shares are then multiplied by the total
number of national jobs to calculate the total number of city jobs with and
without tax rate changes.
20 The revenue cost of a marginal job restored from the 2001 tax cuts can
be estimated—as in footnote 17 above—by ⌬Revenue/⌬Jobs, where
⌬Revenue ⫽ Revenue 䡠 (1 ⫹ ε B, ) 䡠 (⌬ /) and where ⌬Jobs ⫽ Jobs 䡠
ε N⫹M, 䡠 (⌬ /). Using Philadelphia’s 2001 values for wage tax revenues
($706/resident) and city jobs (0.46 jobs/resident) and the OLS estimates
for ε B, (⫽ ⫺0.06: table 2) and ε N⫹M, (⫽ ⫺0.36: table 5), we estimate
the annual revenue loss per new city job created to be ⫺$4,007. The
present value of these annual revenue losses equals $133,583/job
(⫽$4,007/0.03).
21 Each revenue hill is estimated by the relationship Revenue ⫽  䡠
0
B 0 ⫹ ⌬ 䡠 B 0 ⫹  0 䡠 ⌬B ⫹ ⌬ 䡠 ⌬B, where 0 and B 0 are the actual tax
rates and tax base for the last year of our sample, ⌬ is the change in tax
rate from 0 to each new tax rate along the horizontal axis, and ⌬B is the
predicted equilibrium change in base for each ⌬ using each tax’s
estimated ⌬B equation. Finally, to estimate New York City’s income tax

First, each of our cities can raise additional revenues.
With the exception of Houston, higher tax revenues
require higher tax rates and this means lower tax bases.
Because Houston is estimated to be beyond the peak of
its property tax revenue hill, a lower property tax rate is
required to increase city revenues. To maximize revenues, Houston’s property tax rate should be reduced from
2.54% to 2.1%. With this cut in the city’s property tax
rate, the city’s equilibrium property tax base per resident
increases from $40,120/resident to $50,383/resident. This
increase is sufficient to offset the rate reduction. The city
raises an additional $40/resident in property tax revenues.
In contrast to our other three sample cities, Minneapolis is positioned well down the rising portion of its
revenue hill. The city has the potential to more than
double its property tax revenues per resident if it wishes.
The required increase in property tax rates will have a
negative effect on the city’s tax base, however. Were city
officials to move from today’s rate of 3.22% to the
revenue-maximizing rate of 12.5% (we caution that this
rate is well outside our sample range), the value of the
city’s property tax base is predicted to decline by 42%
from its current (2001) value of $47,308/resident to a
new equilibrium base of $27,213/resident.
New York City’s best sources for new revenues are its
property and sales taxes. Moving to the top of the city’s
income tax revenue hill through a proportional increase in
income tax rates, represented in figure 1 as an increase in the
current (2001) top marginal tax rate of 3.59% to the peak
rate of 5.80%, will raise only $35/resident in additional
revenues. Moving to the peak of the city’s property tax
revenue hill by increasing the city’s current (2001) property
tax rate from 2.497% to 3.3% raises an additional $53/
resident in revenues, but as a consequence, average city
property values fall by 20%, from $34,590/resident to
$27,751/resident. The city’s sales tax offers the greatest
potential for new revenues. Increasing the sales tax rate
from the current (2001) rate of 4.0% to the peak rate of
6.2% raises an additional $56/resident, though city sales are
estimated to fall by 26% from their 2001 level of $9,634/
resident to $7,102/resident.
Figure 1 shows Philadelphia to have an unlimited
ability to raise revenues per resident through the city’s
wage tax, but, as noted in section IV above, an increase
in the city’s wage tax rate means proportional losses of
city jobs and residents. There is now a strong political
consensus within the city to continue with at least the
modest scheduled cuts in wage tax rates. Additional
revenue hill, 0 and ⌬ are the tax rates for the average-income household;
however, ⌬B is estimated from changes in the top marginal rate. For our
sample period, the revenue-weighted effective average tax rate is linked to
the top statutory marginal rate as follows: effective average rate ⫽
0.3225 ⫻ (top statutory marginal rate). The top marginal rates is reported
on the horizontal axis of figure 1 for the panel labeled New York City,
Income Tax.
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FIGURE 1.—CITY REVENUE HILLS

The solid lines between dashes represent the portion of the hill which spans the range of our data for city tax rates; the long dashed portions of each hill are projections beyond the sample’s range. Dotted lines
relate tax rates to revenues, first for the current (2001) tax rate, and then for the revenue-maximizing rate to illustrate each tax’s revenue potential.
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revenues of $149/resident are available from the increases in the city property tax rate from today’s (2001)
rate of 2.50% to the peak rate of 4.90%. Average property
values will fall from $18,914/resident to $12,685/
resident, however. The city’s gross receipts tax rate can
raise an additional $50/resident from increasing current
(2001) rates from 0.25% to 0.81%, but gross sales will
decline by 40% from $22,648/resident to $13,515/
resident.
Second, in this period of tight local budgets brought on
by the current recession, Houston and New York City
may have difficulty covering anticipated FY 2004 deficits
with tax increases—New York City particularly. Deficits
in this discussion are from current city budgetary estimates for FY 2004, deflated to 1994 dollars for comparison with our revenue projections in figure 1. The predicted FY 2004 deficit for Houston is $65/resident; figure
1 shows that the city’s currently unused taxing capacity is
$40/resident. The predicted FY 2004 deficit for Minneapolis is $108/resident; figure 1 shows that the city’s
currently unused taxing capacity is well over $1000/
resident. The predicted FY 2004 deficit for New York
City is $620/resident; the sum of the revenue capacities
of the city’s three major taxes is $144/resident. The
predicted FY 2004 deficit for Philadelphia is $126/resident, a gap which can be covered by the $199/resident
taxing capacity now available from property and gross
receipts taxation. Though the tax option is available to
Houston, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia to cover most, if
not all, of their anticipated deficits, New York can only
close a small portion of its deficit gap—we estimate no
more than 23% in equilibrium—with tax increases. Significant spending cuts or substantial increases in federal
and/or state assistance will be needed for New York City
to return to permanent fiscal balance.22
22 In the winter of 2003, New York City faced an estimated deficit of $6.4
billion in current 2003 dollars for its coming 2004 fiscal year. To close the
gap, the city approved a budget which included $1.7 billion in spending cuts,
the reallocation of a $0.8 billion surplus from FY 2003 budget forward to FY
2004, and $2.9 billion in estimated additional tax revenues, to be collected
from higher property, income, and sales taxation. To close the remaining $1
billion budget gap, the city received an additional $1 billion in state fiscal
assistance. (Source: Mr. Frank Posillico of the New York City Independent
Budget Office staff.) In making its revenue projections from the proposed rate
increases, the city used a static (constant base) analysis. Our dynamic
(base-adjusted) analysis suggests the initial estimates may be optimistic, at
least in equilibrium. Our best-case estimates suggest the city can raise at most
$2.25 billion rather than the originally projected $2.9 billion—$1.7 billion
from a one-time, lump-sum levy on property owners, $0.208 billion from the
increase in income tax rates, and finally, $0.341 billion from the joint rate
increase and base expansion in sales taxation. If our dynamic analysis is
correct, New York City will continue to face an equilibrium budget deficit of
at least $650 million in current (2003) dollars. Three comments regarding our
tax analysis are in order. First, and perhaps most importantly, the original
estimate of an additional $1.7 billion in property tax revenues assumes the
proposed 18.5% rate increase will be temporary and can be removed before
property tax bases are reassessed. If property rates cannot be lowered—and
our analysis suggests this will be the case without additional major cuts in city
spending—then the one-time increase becomes permanent, legally required
reassessments to market values will occur, and property bases will decline,
ceteris paribus. If so, the equilibrium increase in property tax revenues must

Third, there is little long-term fiscal relief for our sample
cities from staying the course. Expected annual growth in
tax revenues per resident can be estimated as current (FY
2001) city tax rates times the constant term from each city’s
⌬B i equations, then summed over all taxes. Estimated
annual increases in city revenues equal $25/resident (s.e. ⫽
$17) for Houston, $30/resident (s.e. ⫽ $8) per year for
Minneapolis, $2/resident (s.e. ⫽ $13) per year for New York
City, and ⫺$8/resident (s.e. ⫽ $9) per year in Philadelphia.
Economic growth alone is unlikely to provide much longterm fiscal relief for our sample cities. The revenue hills in
figure 1 are stable in real terms.
Fourth, long-term structural shifts in national aggregate
demand towards core economic activities may be able to
ease city fiscal pressure in two of our cities, Houston and
Philadelphia. But the shifts must be large and permanent. A
permanent 1-standard-deviation increase in oil prices (equal
to $12.60/barrel with respect to our sample mean of $20/
barrel) adds $4,368/resident to Houston’s property tax base
(⫽ ⌬OILP B p /OILP ⫽ ($12.60/$20) ⫻ 6,934; see
table 4) and $109/resident per year to Houston revenues
using the city’s current tax rate (⫽ 0.025 ⫻ $4,368). A
permanent 1-standard-deviation increase in national health
spending of $996/person will increase Philadelphia’s property tax base (the only significant effect) by $8,327/resident
(⫽ ⌬HEXP B p /HEXP ⫽ $996 ⫻ 8.36; see table 4) and
the city’s property tax revenues by $208/resident evaluated
at current tax rates (⫽ 0.025 ⫻ $8,327).
VI.

Conclusions

Understanding the equilibrium effects of local taxation
on the local private economy is important for elected city
leaders, urban policy analysts, and academic economists
alike. The analysis here offers useful lessons for each.
First, elected city officials must learn the reality of
their local revenue constraints. A city’s revenue capacity
is limited by the mobility of its residents and firms. Three
of our cities—Houston, New York City, and Philadelphia—seem to have nearly exhausted that capacity. Barring permanent and significant structural shifts in national demand toward our cities’ outputs, city revenue
be reduced from the original static estimate of $1.7 billion to a base-adjusted,
equilibrium estimate of $0.560 billion. This adjustment adds $1.14 billion to
our estimates of the city’s structural deficit, now totaling $1.79 (⫽$0.650 ⫹
$1.14) billion. Further, the 18.5% increase in property tax rates will place the
city at the top of its equilibrium property tax revenue hill. Second, our
estimates of the dynamic effects of lagged tax rates on the tax base (tables 1
and 2) show that the estimated equilibrium deficit will occur relatively
quickly, within 1 to 2 fiscal years. Third, an expanding private economy—say,
one which succeeds in lowering the national unemployment rate from the
current 6% to a full-employment 4%—will help the city’s income and sales
tax bases (table 2), but not enough to close the estimated equilibrium budget
gap and almost certainly not enough to allow the city to lower its tax rates
back to their FY 2003 levels, as Mayor Bloomberg hopes. There is no
evidence that an accelerating stock market adds significantly to the city’s
income tax base (table 4). City taxpayers should treat the new FY 2004 rates
as permanent, unless of course, deeper spending cuts or more state aid is
forthcoming.
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hills are likely to remain fixed in real terms. Holding city
spending to the rate of inflation therefore seems essential
for Houston and Philadelphia. New York City will have
to make significant real spending cuts to avoid continued
future deficits. Only Minneapolis can raise significant
new revenues from taxation.
Second, for urban policy analysts our results reveal a
fundamental tension between the interests of city public
employees, poor households within the city, and city taxpayers. Tax increases unmatched by tax-financed, compensating service benefits for taxpayers—whether property
owners, consumers, or firms—will drive those taxpayers
from the city. Property values fall, business sales decline,
and the city’s job base shrinks. To protect city economies, a
dollar of taxes paid must be matched by a compensating
dollar of public service benefits. Our evidence suggests this
is not now the case for our sample cities, even for Minneapolis.
Third, for our academic colleagues we have offered an
example of how one might specify and then estimate
governmental revenue hills—“Laffer curves”—based
upon a fully specified general equilibrium model of fiscal
policy in an open economy. The general equilibrium
model presented in Haughwout and Inman (2001, 2002)
gives the needed structural interpretation. We have shown
separately that simulated revenue hills from our structural model calibrated to the Philadelphia economy map
closely the estimated curvature of the revenue hills for
Philadelphia presented in figure 1; see Haughwout and
Inman (2001). Estimated revenue hills also provide the
needed budget constraint for any structural analyses of
the political economy of local fiscal choice. We view our
work here as a complement to the recent research of
Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001); they specify and estimate
a model of local fiscal choice, given the local revenue
hill. We have specified and estimated the revenue hill,
given local fiscal choice. A fully specified structural
model of local finance will join these efforts.
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APPENDIX A
Data Appendix
TABLE A1.—BASES, RATES,
Houston
(1969–2001)

Base p
⌬Base p
 p (%)
⌬ p (%)
Rate changes (⫹/⫺)

$45,594
(8,397)
$242.2
(3,663.7)
1.79
(.47)
0.04
(0.11)
19/10

AND

ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Minneapolis
(1974–2001)
Property Tax
$32,447
(6,595)
$921.1
(1,362.7)
3.20
(.51)
⫺0.003
(0.26)
16/11
Sales and Gross Receipts Taxes

Base s,x
⌬Base s,x
 s,x (%)
⌬ s,x (%)
Rate changes (⫹/⫺)

New York
(1961–2001)

Philadelphia
(1970–2001)

$27,186
(7,037)
$364.6
(2,684.5)
3.48
(.67)
⫺0.02
(0.20)
12/24

$16,207
(2,861)
$124.6
(967.7)
2.76
(.33)
⫺0.02
(0.22)
10/19

$7,807.9
(1,632.4)
$148.5
(717.6)
3.23
(0.87)
0.04
(0.27)
3/1

$18,019.1
(3,657.4)
$376.4
(1,275.2)
0.33
(0.05)
⫺0.00
(0.05)
3/8

$11,063.1
(3,210.7)
$233.6
(1,452.7)
3.26
(1.54)
0.09
(0.45)
5/7

$13,492.5
(1,015.6)
$98.6
(370.4)
(3.36)
(1.38)
0.07
(0.22)
3/6

0.036
(0.007)
⫺0.001
(0.001)

0.008
(0.002)
⫺0.0003
(0.0002)

5.92
(1.47)
⫺0.02
(0.93)
$1,480.8
(607.0)
$40.5
(196.6)
458.6
(198.2)
8.68
(29.33)

5.93
(1.49)
⫺0.02
(0.94)
$831.4
(278.9)
$36.1
(74.3)
543.5
(130.9)
7.24
(32.61)

Income or Wage Taxes
Base w,w⫹m
⌬Base w,w⫹m
 w,w⫹m (%)
⌬ w,w⫹m (%)
Rate changes (⫹/⫺)
Job Shares
Total JOBSHARE
Total ⌬JOBSHARE

UE (%)
⌬UE (%)
Z
⌬Z
CRIME
⌬CRIME
OILP
⌬OILP
FARMY
⌬FARMY
DOW
⌬DOW
HEXP
⌬HEXP

6.27
(1.30)
⫺0.03
(1.00)
$264.1
(36.5)
$3.89
(29.1)
576.2
(107.9)
4.90
(34.55)
1.52
(0.63)
(⫺0.00)
(0.28)

Economic Variables
6.48
(1.46)
⫺0.03
(1.02)
$993.3
(131.3)
$6.70
(125.3)
595.1
(93.6)
3.30
(34.53)

$213.78
(21.83)
$⫺0.002
(16.69)
3,620.3
(1,925.7)
134.3
(499.1)
1,970.0
(995.9)
74.87
(42.64)

Means and standard deviations (within parentheses) are reported. All dollar values are in 1994 dollars. The ⫹/⫺ entries report the number of tax rate increases (⫹) and decreases (⫺) over each city’s sample period.
The variables UE, CRIME, OIL, FARMY, DOW, and HEXP are national values with means and standard deviations calculated for each city’s sample period.

LOCAL REVENUE HILLS: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR U.S. CITIES
APPENDIX B
First-Stage Estimates for Changes in Local Tax Rates
Table B1 summarizes the first-stage estimates used to predict changes
in city tax rates for each of our sample cities. The dependent variable is the
change in the local tax rate. Independent variables include a constant term,
a time trend, the lagged national rate of unemployment, and then a set of
excluded predetermined variables meant to be instruments for predicting
changes in city rates. Possible instruments common to all cities include
lagged unexpected state aid (UAID ⫺1 ), lagged changes in state income
tax rates (⌬S,⫺1), lagged changes in the state’s share of total state and
local government spending (⌬SHR ⫺1 ), an indicator variable for the fiscal
year prior to mayoral elections (ELECT), and the local tax rate in the last
year of the previous mayoral administration (PRATE). City-specific
instruments include: changes in the state-allowed ratios of assessment
rates for commercial and residential properties (⌬ASSRATIO, Minneapolis),
an indicator variable for FY 1987 to reflect the adoption of the federal tax
reform in 1986 redefining the tax base for local income taxes linked

to the federal income tax code (REFORM86, New York City), an indicator
variable for FY 1977 to reflect the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s
revelation of the city’s 1976 fiscal deficit (DEFICIT76, Philadelphia), an
indicator variable for FY 1985 to reflect the 1984 state reform of city business
taxation (BTX84, Philadelphia), and the change in the percentage share of
minority representation on the Philadelphia City Council (⌬MINREP, Philadelphia), particularly dramatic following the conviction of six incumbent
Council members for corruption in 1980. The final first-stage estimates use
only those instrumental variables whose coefficients exceeded their standard
errors; see table B1. Only coefficient estimates for the instruments are
reported in table B1. Also reported in table B1 are the R2 for each first-stage
regression, the F-test statistic and associated p-values for the test of overall
significance of the instruments in the first-stage regressions, and finally, the 2
test statistic and associated p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are rightly excluded from the second-stage structural equation. In all
cases, the instruments as a set are statistically significant determinants of
changes in city tax rates (or, in the case of the New York City income tax rate,
nearly so), and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
appropriately excluded from the second-stage tax base equation.

TABLE B1.—FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATES

UAID ⫺1
⌬ S,⫺1
⌬SHR ⫺1

Houston

Minneapolis

⌬ p

⌬ p

⌬ p

⌬ s

0.002
(0.001)

⫺0.0009
(0.0007)

⫺0.0005
(0.0003)
⫺0.136
(0.137)
10.2
(3.9)
⫺0.237
(0.076)
⫺0.187
(0.061)

0.0008
(0.0003)

2.45
(1.33)

ELECT
PRATE
⌬ASSRATIO

⫺0.178
(0.107)

⫺0.188
(0.101)
⫺0.299
(0.119)

FOR

LOCAL TAX RATE CHANGES

New York

Philadelphia
⌬ w

⌬ p

0.342
(0.245)

0.003
(0.001)
⫺0.173
(0.117)

BTX84
⌬MINREP
0.455
4.31
(0.01)
1.53
(0.46)

⌬ w⫹m

0.176
(0.081)

0.050
(0.033)

0.295
(0.263)

0.907
(0.147)
⫺0.080
(0.108)
⫺3.03
(1.02)

0.100
(0.049)
⫺0.055
(0.036)

0.883
(0.189)
0.199
(0.138)

0.734
9.10
(0.001)
3.39
(0.64)

0.285
2.78
(0.06)
0.06
(0.97)

0.610
7.02
(0.001)
5.86
(0.12)

⫺0.894
(0.481)

DEFICIT76

0.418
3.08
(0.04)
2.06
(0.36)

⌬ x

0.115
(0.081)

REFORM86

R2
F
(p-value)
2
(p-value)

585

0.528
3.60
(0.01)
1.32
(0.86)

0.227
3.46
(0.04)
1.12
(0.29)

0.392
2.35
(0.11)
0.39
(0.53)
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